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ABSTRACT

Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of influenza type B in human hosts is a public
health concern as we strive to minimize the disease burden in seasonal epidemics. Vaccination is considered the best defense against contracting influenza, and everyone over the age
of 6 months is advised to get vaccinated before each season. The effect that vaccine-acquired
immunity has on the evolution of influenza B remains unclear. In the U.S., vaccine-uptake
is irregular across the states, and the differing coverages present an opportunity to study
how vaccination influences viral evolution. This thesis analyzes the evolutionary patterns of
influenza B in the presence of vaccine-induced selective pressure. Using an ecological study
design, estimates on statewide vaccination coverages from the Centers for Disease Control
and Prevention were related to influenza B sequence data. The phylogenies and the frequencies of single nucleotide polymorphisms for high and low coverage states across three
influenza seasons were compared to evaluate if there was evidence of vaccination influencing
evolution. Overall, the results show that vaccination does not significantly impact the evolutionary dynamics of influenza B with both high and low coverage states showing interspersed
phylogenetic trees and similar antigenic diversities.
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CHAPTER 1:

INTRODUCTION

Influenza, an acute respiratory disease commonly known as the flu, is the result of a viral
infection. Illness due to influenza can be anywhere from mild to severe, with symptoms
appearing one to four days after exposure and successful infection of a host (Heymann,
2014). Figure 1.1 outlines a typical manifestation of influenza from exposure to recovery.
Upon infection of a host, influenza virions will begin to replicate within the epithelial cells in
the nose, throat, and lungs (Taubenberger & Morens, 2008). The clinical presentation of the
illness lasts, on average, from three to seven days, and symptoms include fatigue, coughing,
and a sore throat among others (Heymann, 2014).
Ideally, individuals infected with influenza will recover within seven days, and viral shed-

Figure 1.1: Clinical presentation of disease due to influenza infection.
1

ding will cease. However, even typical presentations can cause significant disease burden.
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention maintains statistics on the estimated number of cases for each influenza season in the United States. Epidemics from the 1979-1980
season up until the 2000-2001 season resulted in an estimated average 226,000 hospitalizations per influenza epidemic (Thompson et al., 2004). The 2016-2017 season presented an
estimated 30.9 million reported cases (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, 2018),
and a cumulative incidence for hospitalization of 65 per 100,000 population (Blanton et al.,
2017). The following 2017-2018 season was particularly severe. The epidemic, spanning from
October 1, 2017, to April 30, 2018, recorded a cumulative incidence of 106.6 influenza-related
hospitalizations per 100,000 population and is reported to be the deadliest in over a decade
(Garten et al., 2018). Mortality was markedly high in pediatric age groups, and in adults
65 years or older. It is noteworthy that age is among the risk factors for severe influenza.
Children younger than 5 and adults 65 years or older are considered high-risk groups for
developing complications.
In general, anyone is susceptible to suffering severe complications due to influenza, and
these are more likely to present when new strains of the virus, for which immunity has not yet
developed, begin circulating in the human population. In the United States, the influenza
season spans from October up until May of the following year, and cases spike during the
months of February and March. Similar to other diseases, influenza cannot spread as readily
in populations with high levels of immunity. Before the beginning of each season, scientists
predict the most prevalent influenza strains and develop a vaccine that confers protection.
Vaccination is considered the best defense against contracting influenza, and everyone over
the age of 6 months is advised to get vaccinated, with an emphasis on individuals at high
risk of serious complications.
The immunity conferred from vaccination is known to decline over time, and it is recommended to get a new dose before the start of, or even during, the seasonal epidemic. Aside
from waning protection, the virus itself is constantly mutating, making previous vaccina2

tions ineffective. Viral evolution occurs as an attempt to evade the host immune system.
Hosts develop natural immunity as a result of infection by creating antibodies to combat
the invading virus. In response to this pressure, the influenza virus will alter its structure
to avoid detection and continue within-host replication. Analogous to the natural immune
system, vaccines stimulate antibody production in the host and, as such, they exert a similar
pressure to evolve on the invading virus. However, the overall significance of this pressure
in viral evolution remains unclear.

1.1

Statement of the Problem
Understanding the evolutionary dynamics of influenza in human hosts is a concern in

public health as we attempt to avoid the next pandemic and minimize disease burden in
seasonal epidemics. The role vaccinations play in the process is uncertain as the mechanisms
driving mutation are both several and complex. Despite recommendations, vaccine uptake
remains irregular in the United States with some states showing lower coverage compared to
others. The differing coverage presents an opportunity to study how vaccination influences
viral evolution.
Presently, studies regarding the effects of vaccination on evolutionary dynamics have
focused on influenza A subtypes (Boni, 2008; Chong & Ikematsu, 2017; Debbink et al.,
2017; Dinis et al., 2016), following a long established trend where influenza research centers
around influenza A. Previous studies have shown influenza type B to evolve at a slower rate
compared to influenza A (Berton, Naeve, & Webster, 1984; Yamashita, Krystal, Fitch, &
Palese, 1988; Webster & Berton, 1981), and it is known to cause less disease burden (Glezen,
Schmier, Kuehn, Ryan, & Oxford, 2013). However, influenza B still poses a significant public
health threat that should not be overlooked.
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1.2

Objectives
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the evolutionary patterns of influenza type B

in the presence of vaccine-induced selective pressure. Using an ecological study design, the
antigenic diversity for states with high and low vaccine uptake rates will be compared, with
the specific objective to answer the question: does influenza type B evolve differently in
populations with low vaccination coverage compared to higher coverage populations.

Specific Objectives
To accomplish the objective stated above the following specific objectives are identified:
• Compare the phylogenies of high and low coverage populations to identify evidence of
divergence in viral evolution.
• Analyze the antigenic sequences to inspect evidence of clustering by level of vaccination
coverage.
• Measure and compare viral diversity by inspecting the frequency of single nucleotide
variants in high and low coverage populations.

1.3

Main Contributions
This thesis adds to the body of information available for influenza virus in humans.

Specifically, it increases knowledge in two areas that have so far gone understudied. The
main contributions are as follows:
1. Increase the body of knowledge available for influenza type B, a generally lesser studied
type of influenza.
2. Expand the research regarding the effects of vaccination in viral evolution.

4

CHAPTER 2:

LITERATURE REVIEW

2.1

Influenza Virus
Influenza is an RNA virus belonging to the Orthomyxoviridae family (Couch, 1996).

Contrary to DNA viruses, which have deoxyribonucleic acid as their genetic material, RNA
viruses use ribonucleic acid to encode genetic information and cannot proofread during replication. The absence of this mechanism results in a higher number of changes in the copied
genome called mutations (Domingo & Holland, 1997).
An influenza virus can be one of four distinct types: A, B, C, and the most recently
discovered type D (Couch, 1996; Hause et al., 2013). Structurally, the virus is characterized
by its segmented genome. Types A and B are comprised of eight RNA segments that encode
the viral genes, and types C and D are formed by seven segments (Bouvier & Palese, 2008;
Su, Fu, Li, Kerlin, & Veit, 2017). The single segment difference between types A and B,
and types C and D, is directly related to the cell-binding process that is necessary for viral
replication. The proteins responsible for the binding and subsequent release of the virus in
influenza A and B are the hemagglutinin (HA) and the neuraminidase (NA), respectively.
In types C and D, this dual function is accomplished by the single protein hemagglutininesterase-fusion (HEF). All three, HA, NA and HEF, are glycoproteins that reside on the
surface of the virus, but, unlike the hemagglutinin-esterase-fusion protein, hemagglutinin
and neuraminidase are not antigenically stable. Both the HA and the NA undergo frequent
genetic changes in a process known as antigenic drift (Couch, 1996).
Human hosts can be afflicted with types A, B and C, though type C has not been
5

found to cause epidemics. Type D has been found in cattle and is not thought to infect
humans. In general, the public health concern for influenza types C and D is much lower
due to its antigenic stability (Su et al., 2017). Infection with type C leads to mild symptoms
(Jelley et al., 2016), and because the HEF glycoprotein undergoes very little genetic change,
it is thought that infection and subsequent recovery from influenza C will result in longlasting immunity. In fact, studies have shown that humans acquire antibodies to this type
of influenza during childhood (Salez et al., 2014; Matsuzaki et al., 2006).
The concern for influenza type A and B is much greater. Both are known to cause seasonal
epidemics and disease burden, and influenza type A specifically has the potential to cause
pandemics through a process known as antigenic shift (Couch, 1996). Although influenza
type A and B contain the same number of RNA segments, important genetic distinctions
exist in the segments that encode the hemagglutinin and neuraminidase glycoproteins. For
influenza type A, the RNA segments responsible for these two proteins can encode for multiple subtypes of both the hemagglutinin and the neuraminidase. So far, there are a total
of 18 known HA subtypes and 11 known NA subtypes (Shao et al., 2017). Influenza A is
further identified by the combination of subtypes the virus presents (e.g., H3N2 refers to
influenza A with hemagglutinin subtype 3 and neuraminidase subtype 2). The existence of
multiple subtypes raises the possibility for pandemic influenza, as combinations that have
never existed in human hosts or for which immunity has waned, can potentially arise through
zoonosis. Perhaps the most notable occurrence of this is the 1918 influenza pandemic, better
known as the Spanish Flu. This global epidemic is thought to have infected approximately
one-third of the worlds population, and while an exact death toll is not available, accepted
estimates range around 50 million deaths (Taubenberger & Morens, 2008).
Unlike influenza type A, multiple subtypes for the HA and NA proteins do not exist for
influenza B and as such it does not pose the threat of pandemics. Both types, however, do
undergo changes in the nucleotide sequences of the encoding RNA. Antigenic drift is said to
occur when the accumulation of changes lead to a different expression of amino acids in either
6

the HA or NA glycoproteins (Mumford, 2007). Seasonal epidemics are the result of antigenic
drift, as this process continually generates new strains of influenza type A and type B capable
of evading natural host immunity as well as the immunity conferred by vaccinations.

Mechanisms Behind Viral Evolution
For influenza type A and B, the mechanisms driving evolution are several. As an RNA
virus, influenza has short replication times with the first sheddings occurring as quickly
as 6 hours post-infection (Couch, 1996). Combined with the absence of a proofreading
mechanism to detect errors during transcription, the quick replication times lead to a high
volume of imperfect copies known as mutants or quasi-species (Domingo & Holland, 1997).
Transmission bottlenecks reduce the level of diversity generated during replication, as not
all of the mutations are able to infect host cells, eventually dying out.
Genetic drift occurs as random mutations begin to accumulate, changing amino acid
sequences and increasing the genetic distance from the original infecting virus. Antigenic
characteristics can change due to drift (i.e., antigenic drift) or as the result of genetic reassortment (Mumford, 2007). For both influenza type A and B, reassortment can occur when
host cells become infected with more than one influenza virus lineage (or subtype lineage
for influenza type A) (Maljkovic Berry et al., 2016; Dudas, Bedford, Lycett, & Rambaut,
2015). Because the virus is segmented, recombination events can lead to the genetic material
from both co-infecting viruses being used. For influenza type A, if the co-infecting viruses
present different surface glycoproteins HA or NA, the reassortment can result in antigenic
shift (Brooke, 2017).
The aforementioned mechanisms result in a genetic diversity for both interhost and intrahost populations. Environmental factors also influence evolutionary dynamics, as the size
and structure of the host population can either inhibit or promote the mechanisms driving
diversity (Mumford, 2007). For example, closed populations are less likely to become coinfected with more than one virus strain thus inhibiting diversity by reassortment. Likewise,
7

smaller and sparsely populated communities are unlikely to have sustained transmission.
Internally, the survival and continuous replication of mutations depend on the ability
to transmit and on the successful evasion of a host immune response. It has been well
established that natural host immunity influences the evolutionary dynamics of viruses by
forcing the selection of immune escape variants (Bouvier & Palese, 2008; van de Sandt,
Kreijtz, & Rimmelzwaan, 2012). However, the effects of vaccine-acquired immunity on the
evolution of influenza type A and B are not fully understood.

2.2

Animal Studies
Several animals can become infected with subtypes of influenza A and develop the disease.

Similar to humans, vaccination has been used to curb the spread and eradicate the disease
from animal populations. Overall, attempts to understand the role that vaccines play in the
viral evolution within animal hosts have reached inconsistent results.
The effects of vaccinating poultry have been previously investigated. Lee, Senne, and
Suarez (2004) studied the impacts of long-term vaccination in poultry in Mexico. Since 1995,
the country had introduced a large-scale vaccination program that continued for several years
to eradicate an endemic strain of low-pathogenic avian influenza H5N2. Results showed
significant antigenic drift from the vaccine strain used and higher mutation rates for the
Mexican lineage strain where ongoing vaccination occurred compared to strains circulating
in the United States. Other studies have reported similar results (Salaheldin et al., 2017;
Kandeil et al., 2017).
Cattoli et al. (2011) investigated the relationship between different vaccination policies
for poultry on the viral evolution of highly pathogenic avian influenza H5N1. In their study,
they analyzed and compared H5N1 virus strains from two countries that adopted vaccination
to the strains of the same subtype found in three countries that did not apply vaccination.
The results of this study indicated evidence of different evolutionary dynamics, with the two
countries that vaccinated their poultry showing higher rates of nucleotide substitution in the
8

HA proteins.
Not all findings have supported vaccine-induced selective pressure in avian influenza.
Contrary to what Cattoli et al. (2011) observed, Long et al. (2011) found no correlation
between drift mutations and vaccination status. In their study, 15 HA glycoproteins samples
were sequenced, belonging to H5N1 subtype virus strains that were circulating in provinces of
southern Vietnam. However, only four of the samples came from farms recently implementing
vaccination and the percentage of poultry that was vaccinated with the recommended two
doses was unknown.
Other animal hosts for influenza have also exhibited evidence of vaccine-induced pressure.
A longitudinal challenge study compared the strains of canine influenza from immunologically
naive dogs and vaccinated dogs (Hoelzer et al., 2010). Higher mutation rates were observed
in the antigens of the vaccinated group suggesting vaccine-induced escape variants. However,
the mutations were mostly transient and were no longer observed after a few days.
A study done by Murcia et al. (2013) investigated the evolutionary dynamics present
in equine influenza. Four horses were vaccinated and then exposed to a seeder horse with
H3N8 equine influenza and subsequently followed throughout the course of their disease.
Viral diversity appeared similar to that of naive horses; however, the authors did note that
this may be due to a stronger intrahost bottleneck. They reported similar findings when
they studied Eurasian avian-like influenza in pigs (Murcia et al., 2012).

2.3

Human Studies
In human studies, research on the effects of vaccination in evolutionary dynamics is lim-

ited and has focused mainly on influenza A subtypes and specifically on the hemagglutinin
glycoprotein as this antigen is the main target for protection conferring antibodies (Gomez
Lorenzo & Fenton, 2013). Attempts to understand viral evolution have generated both mathematical simulations (Carrat, Lavenu, Cauchemez, & Deleger, 2006; Boni, Gog, Andreasen,
& Feldman, 2006) and epidemiological studies. Boni (2008) investigated whether antigenic
9

drift was observable within single seasons (i.e., 1 to 2 years). In total, samples from 10 influenza seasons from different geographic locations were analyzed to see if genetic distances
were larger closer to the end of a season. Although some seasons did display a significant
positive correlation between genetic distance and time, it was not a general occurrence,
indicating that the time-scale over which antigenic drift occurs is not fixed.
In Japan, Chong and Ikematsu (2017) analyzed the HA gene sequences from the H3N2
isolates collected from vaccinated and immunologically naive individuals over four consecutive influenza seasons, from 2011 to 2015. The sequences for both groups were compared to
the vaccine strains used during each season, and it was found that samples from vaccinated
individuals presented a greater number of amino acid deviations from the vaccine strain.
The rates of amino acid differences within epitope sites were also higher in the vaccinated
group, suggesting that vaccination results in more antigenic diversity.
Contrary to the results reported by Chong and Ikematsu (2017), Debbink et al. (2017)
did not observe any significant impact from vaccination in the intrahost diversity of H3N2.
Using samples gathered from a randomized clinical trial of influenza vaccine efficacy, they
examined whether vaccination resulted in observable escape variants using a clustering analysis; however, mutations did not appear to cluster by vaccination status. The study by Dinis
et al. (2016) obtained similar results that suggested a purifying selection process occurred
limiting intrahost diversity.
Overall, no clear consensus has been reached on how vaccination impacts the evolution
of influenza. The focus has been mainly on subtypes of influenza A, and in both animal
studies and human studies, results have varied. The public health importance to elucidate
the evolutionary dynamics of the influenza virus remain relevant given the significant disease
burden faced each season.
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CHAPTER 3:

MATERIALS AND METHODS

3.1

Study Design
As part of an effort to reduce the morbidity and mortality caused by influenza in the

United States, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention collaborates with public
health partners at the state and local levels to conduct year-round surveillance on influenza
infections (Jester et al., 2018). The data collected are used to build weekly statistical reports regarding influenza activity across the United States. Specimens that test positive for
influenza are also sequenced and submitted to GenBank along with information about the
sample including the virus’ classification (e.g., type, subtype or lineage) and the geographical
location from which it originated (Clark, Karsch-Mizrachi, Lipman, Ostell, & Sayers, 2016).
GenBank provides access to publicly available nucleotide sequences for the HA segment of
submitted influenza specimens; however, samples do not come annotated with the vaccination status of the host. The CDC estimates vaccination coverage across the country by
using data from several nationally representative surveys. By using an ecological study design, these independent data sources can be leveraged to analyze the evolutionary dynamics
of influenza.
Ecological studies aggregate information for entire populations rather than individuals
and are ideal for correlating risk factors to geographies and temporal trends. The most notorious limitation of this design is the risk of committing an ecological fallacy (Aschengrau
& Seage, 2013). That is, inferring that the findings for the population apply to the individuals. Despite limitations, this design is the most appropriate for answering the research
11

Table 3.1: Seasonal vaccination coverage and sample availability for Victoria. Coverage data
for states is presented as a percentage with standard deviation.
Season
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

Low Coverage
State
% (σ)
N
Florida
29.7 (1.8) 11
Louisiana 31.8 (2.7) 19
California 29.6 (1.6) 19

High Coverage
State
% (σ)
N
Connecticut 42.6 (2.4) 18
Connecticut 43.6 (2.4) 25
Delaware
36.4 (2.7) 14

Table 3.2: Seasonal vaccination coverage and sample availability for Yamagata. Coverage
data for states is presented as a percentage with standard deviation.
Season
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

Low Coverage
State
% (σ)
Florida 29.7 (1.8)
Texas
32.9 (2.9)
Florida 22.8 (2.2)

N
12
18
18

High Coverage
State
% (σ)
N
Virginia
40.7 (2.4) 16
Washington 40.7 (1.8) 11
Washington 39.5 (2.2) 18

question. This study uses states belonging to the contiguous United States as the units of
analysis and evaluates if an association exists between the level of vaccination coverage and
the evolutionary patterns of influenza type B.

3.2

Study Population
Three seasons of influenza across states with high and low vaccination coverage were

analyzed. Identification of statewide vaccination coverage percentages was done through
estimates from the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention for influenza seasons 20152016, 2016-2017 and 2017-2018.
To be included in the study, samples had to belong to human hosts that tested positive
for influenza type B. The collection date for the samples must have taken place between
October 1st and May 31st of the following year to be considered part of the influenza season.
All samples must present a complete HA segment and specify the lineage of influenza type
B (i.e., Victoria or Yamagata). To be able to adjust for prior immune experience, the host
age had to have been provided and fall between 18 and 64 years.

12

3.3

Data Sources
Sample data for the hemagglutinin segment of influenza B virus was collected using the

EpiFlu Database from the GISAID platform (Shu & McCauley, 2017). The Global Initiative
on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID) was created in 2008 as an alternative to GenBank
although data between the two may overlap. The data is public domain; however, users must
agree to certain terms of use before being granted access. Any necessary informed consent
authorizations for use of the influenza virus sequences are obtained during primary collection
and prior to submission to the EpiFlu database.
A total of 2083 records were reviewed for this study. After applying inclusion criteria, 199
records, belonging to states with high and low vaccination coverage across three influenza
seasons, were selected. Tables 3.1 and 3.2 describe the vaccination coverage and sample
distribution for each of the three influenza seasons. A total of 29 and 28 samples are available
for the Victoria and Yamagata lineages, respectively for the 2015-2016 season; 44 Victoria
and 29 Yamagata samples are available for the 2016-2017 season; and 33 Victoria and 36
Yamagata samples are available for the 2017-2018 influenza season.

3.4

Statistical Analysis
Statistical differences between host characteristics for high and low coverage populations

were evaluated using a two-tailed t-test with p-values under 0.05 considered significant.
Fishers exact test was used to determine any significant differences in gender proportions.
For analysis of the antigenic diversity, a two-tailed Welch’s t-test for unequal variance was
used. Multiple comparisons were addressed using a Bonferroni correction resulting in pvalues under 0.0125 being considered significant.
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3.5

Bioinformatics Analysis
Traditional epidemiological studies deal with rates of disease cases in the presence of expo-

sures. In these studies, attempting to attribute causation consists in building a mathematical
model that explains the relationship between the outcome and the exposure. Investigating
viral evolution, unlike traditional studies, does not require analyzing rates of disease cases,
but rather the changes in the virus. In these studies, the data used for analysis is biological
(e.g., nucleotide or amino acid sequences) and concerns the virus itself instead of the carrier
host. As such, when working with data from Biological databases, a bioinformatic analysis
must be used.

Sequence Alignment
All sequences were imported into the Influenza Research Database (IRD) workbench
(Zhang et al., 2017). For each season, sequences were aligned using the MUSCLE alignment
algorithm (Edgar, 2004) provided in the workbench.

Phylogenetic Analysis
Just as a genealogical tree shows the ancestry of families through time, a phylogenetic
tree shows the evolution of a species. Through inspection of the branches of the tree diagram,
it is possible to elucidate how closely related a set of viruses are to one another by examining
the formation of clades. A clade is defined as the entire set of organisms that descend from
one common ancestor. Theoretically, viruses that have undergone different evolutionary
patterns will diverge to separate branches, whereas those with a similar ancestry will appear
to cluster closer together.
For each influenza season, a maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree for the aligned hemagglutinin sequences was built with PhyML 3.0 (Guindon et al., 2010). Using the Model Compare feature from IRD, the HKY85 substitution model was identified as providing the highest
14

parsimony while still maintaining a high log-likelihood. Statistical confidence in the tree was
assessed using bootsrapping with 1, 000 replicates.

Single Nucleotide Polymorphisms
Single nucleotide polymorphisms (SNPs) occur when there is a genetic variation at a
singular position in the sequence. Higher frequencies of SNPs lead to more viral diversity
and could potentially indicate the presence of a selective pressure driving viral evolution.
Using SNPGenie (Nelson, Moncla, & Hughes, 2015), estimates of non-synonymous (dN )
and synonymous (dS ) polymorphisms were calculated separately on the aligned sequences
for states with high and low levels of vaccination coverage. Standard errors were calculated
using bootstrapping (n = 1000 replicates) to assess statistical confidence.
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CHAPTER 4:

RESULTS

4.1

Host Characteristics
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 show descriptive statistics for the age and gender of the hosts of the

viral samples for each of the three influenza seasons. Overall, host characteristics were not
significantly different between populations for either lineage in any season. Individuals infected with the Victoria lineage were on average younger than those infected with Yamagata.
Table 4.1: Host characteristics for Victoria samples.
2015-2016
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender
Male
Female
2016-2017
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender
Male
Female
2017-2018
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender
Male
Female

Low Coverage

High Coverage

11
28.18 (9.49)

18
21.72 (4.43)

4
7

3
15

19
25.68 (13.88)

25
29.48 (8.15)

9
10

7
18

19
27.53 (9.17)

14
28.07 (6.78)

6
13

5
9

16

p-value

0.05
0.37

0.30
0.22

0.85
1.0

Table 4.2: Host characteristics for Yamagata samples.
2015-2016
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender∗
Male
Female
2016-2017
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender
Male
Female
2017-2018
N
Age x̄(σ)
Gender∗
Male
Female

Low Coverage

High Coverage

12
46.08 (10.00)

16
49.38 (13.50)

10
2

10
4

18
46.00 (12.96)

11
47.64 (11.11)

11
7

8
3

18
45.56 (11.92)

18
42.44 (15.46)

10
8

6
11

p-value

0.46
0.56

0.72
0.69

0.50
0.31

∗ Gender was missing for some samples.

4.2

Phylogenetic Analysis
Viral sequences that have undergone divergent evolutionary paths will be shown in a

phylogenetic tree to appear on different branches. In the presence of a selective pressure
capable of driving viral evolution, the expectation would be to see a separation between the
sequences confronted with the pressure and those naive to it.
To examine whether vaccination exerts a selective pressure capable of influencing evolution, the maximum-likelihood phylogenetic tree for each influenza season was built using the
sequences from both high and low vaccination coverage populations. Figures 4.1-4.6 display
the trees for the Victoria and Yamagata lineages for influenza seasons 2015-2016, 2016-2017
and 2017-2018. All trees were drawn using Dendroscope 3 (Huson et al., 2007). Sequences
from low coverage populations are highlighted in bold.
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Figure 4.1: Phylogenetic tree for the Victoria 2015-2016 influenza season. The maximumlikelihood bootstrap consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a
confidence of <50 collapsed for easier visualization. Sequences from Florida (low coverage)
are shown in bold.
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Figure 4.2: Phylogenetic tree for the Yamagata 2015-2016 influenza season. The maximumlikelihood bootstrap consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a
confidence of <50 collapsed for easier visualization. Sequences from Florida (low coverage)
are shown in bold.
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Figure 4.3: Phylogenetic tree for the Victoria 2016-2017 influenza season. The maximumlikelihood bootstrap consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a
confidence of <50 collapsed for easier visualization. Sequences from Louisiana (low coverage)
are shown in bold.
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Figure 4.4: Phylogenetic tree for the Yamagata 2016-2017 influenza season. The bootstrap
consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a confidence of <50 collapsed for easier visualization. Sequences from Texas (low coverage) are shown in bold.
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Figure 4.5: Phylogenetic tree for the Victoria 2017-2018 influenza season. The bootstrap consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a confidence of <50 collapsed
for easier visualization. Sequences from California (low coverage) are shown in bold.
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Figure 4.6: Phylogenetic tree for the Yamagata 2017-2018 influenza season. The bootstrap
consensus tree for 1000 replicates is shown with nodes presenting a confidence of <50 collapsed for easier visualization. Sequences from Florida (low coverage) are shown in bold.

23

Overall, the HA viral sequences from populations with high and low vaccination coverage
are interspersed throughout the trees and do not appear to cluster based on coverage. One
notable exception is the phylogenetic tree for the Victoria lineage of the 2017-2018 influenza
season. In this case, the viral sequences from Delaware (high coverage) achieve perfect
separation from the samples belonging to California (low coverage), clustering into a single
clade. Outside of this instance, the largest clade seen for a high or low coverage population
has a total of 9 sequences and belongs to the Victoria lineage seen in Connecticut (high
coverage) during the 2015-2016 season.

4.3

Antigenic Diversity
In most instances, even without vaccination, hosts will respond to viral infection by

creating antibodies that combat the invading organism. The pressure to evade host antibodies combined with the absence of a proofreading mechanism during replication result in
mutations; most notably in the antigens. As such, single nucleotide polymorphisms in the
hemagglutinin segment are expected to occur naturally, even without any external pressure.
A polymorphism that results in a change of amino acid is called non-synonymous, and alternatively, one that continues to encode the same amino acid is said to be synonymous. The
dN and dS statistics calculate the frequency of non-synonymous and synonymous substitutions, respectively. An elevated frequency in these values may be an indication of an outside
force influencing evolution.
To evaluate if populations with higher vaccination coverage presented any discernible
difference in frequency of SNPs, the dN and the dS statistics were estimated for both high
and low coverage states. As done by Dinis et al. (2016), the mean dN and mean dS values
were then compared between populations.
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 show the comparisons of the dN and dS statistics, respectively for
both the Victoria and Yamagata lineages in each of the three influenza seasons. A statistically significant difference was found in the Victoria lineage for the 2017-2018 season. The
24

Table 4.3: Comparison of mean dN values for high and low coverage populations.
Low Coverage
dN
SE

High Coverage
dN
SE

Victoria
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

0.52
1.45
1.46

0.31
0.56
0.64

0.87
2.02
NA

0.34
0.69

0.45
0.52
0.03∗

Yamagata
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

1.30
0.66
0.50

0.51
0.26
0.21

1.32
2.10
0.33

0.51
0.84
0.16

0.97
0.10
0.53

p-value

Mean dN values and standard errors are shown in scientific notation (×10−3 ).
All p-values were calculated using a two-tailed Welch’s t-test.
∗ p-value for test evaluating deviance from zero due to zero mean and SE.

Table 4.4: Comparison of mean dS values for high and low coverage populations.
Low Coverage
dS
SE

High Coverage
dS
SE

p-value

Victoria
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

8.31
8.58
16.60

2.07
2.15
3.46

5.58
11.52
2.19

1.75
2.54
1.31

0.32
0.38
<0.001

Yamagata
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

18.70
18.12
17.32

3.67
3.21
3.68

16.61
25.91
20.60

3.67
5.50
3.69

0.69
0.22
0.53

Mean dS values and standard errors are shown in scientific notation (×10−3 ).
All p-values were calculated using a two-tailed Welch’s t-test.

difference in mean dS values was highly significant (p < 0.001) with California presenting
a higher mean dS compared to Delaware (16.60 × 10−3 vs. 2.19 × 10−3 ). In the same year
and lineage, Delaware did not exhibit any non-synonymous polymorphisms and presented a
standard error equal to zero. Because a zero variance in one sample reduces the formula for
Welch’s t-test to a one-sample t-test, the p-value obtained for this instance is not a comparison between populations, but rather an evaluation on whether the mean dN value for
California deviates significantly from zero. This value was not found to be significant, and
no other comparisons between populations achieved statistical significance.
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Table 4.5: dN/dS ratios for high and low coverage populations.
Low Coverage
dN/dS p-value

High Coverage
dN/dS p-value

Victoria
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

0.06
0.17
0.09

<0.001
<0.01
<0.001

0.15
0.18
0

<0.01
<0.001
0.09

Yamagata
2015-2016
2016-2017
2017-2018

0.07
0.04
0.03

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

0.08
0.08
0.02

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

Table 4.5 shows the results of calculating the dN/dS ratio for high and low coverage
states. The dN/dS statistic indicates the type of natural selection taking place. A dN/dS
ratio > 1 shows that positive selection is occurring as more non-synonymous polymorphisms
are present, leading to increased viral diversity. Negative selection is said to be taking place
when the dN/dS ratio is <1, indicating that non-synonymous SNPs are present only at a
lower frequency, theoretically as the result of a purification process that removes deleterious
mutations. A dN/dS = 1 signifies neutrality. All dN/dS ratios for both high and low
coverage populations were <1 indicating purifying selection. p-values were calculated to
determine if there was a significant difference from neutrality, with all except one falling
under 0.01. The high coverage Delaware population for the Victoria lineage of the 2017-2018
influenza season did not present any non-synonymous polymorphisms and as such had a
dN/dS = 0 but did not achieve statistical significance (p = 0.09).
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CHAPTER 5:

DISCUSSION

This thesis set out to determine if there was any evidence indicating a difference in the
evolutionary patterns for influenza type B based on vaccine uptake. Using an ecological
study design, statewide vaccination coverage estimates were related to biological data for
influenza B viruses. Although an ecological study cannot by itself establish a causal link, it
can identify associations that merit further consideration.
Influenza vaccine uptake estimates were obtained through data reported to the Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention, and states with high and low coverage were identified for
three influenza seasons. Nucleotide sequences for the hemagglutinin segment of influenza B
viruses were collected for these states using the EpiFlu database. Using bioinformatic tools,
the phylogenetic trees and frequencies of single nucleotide polymorphisms were estimated
for populations reporting high and low influenza vaccine uptake. Overall, there is minimal
evidence suggesting that vaccination induces a significant selective pressure on the viral
evolution of influenza type B.
Phylogenetic analyses for the 2015-2016- 2016-2017 and 2017-2018 HA segments were
conducted with the expectation that if vaccination was inducing a significant selective pressure, then this would be evidenced by the formation of distinct clades based on vaccination
coverage. With one notable exception, the HA segments from both low and high coverage populations were mostly interspersed throughout the trees. These results are consistent
with what has been observed for the phylogenies for different strains of the influenza A virus
(Chong & Ikematsu, 2017; Debbink et al., 2017; Dinis et al., 2016), suggesting that like with
influenza A, vaccination status does not appear to impact the evolution of the influenza B
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lineages.
The antigenic diversity present in each of the three influenza seasons was estimated by
calculating the number of single nucleotide polymorphisms, both as synonymous and nonsynonymous mutations. If vaccination produces a selective pressure on influenza B, then
more diversity would be expected in populations with higher coverages. Furthermore, the
increased diversity would be reflected in the number of non-synonymous changes present as
these are escape mutations that allow the virus to evade antibody recognition. Neither population consistently presented more synonymous mutations compared to the other. However,
higher coverage states generally showed a larger amount of non-synonymous substitutions.
The exceptions to this trend occurred during the 2017-2018 influenza season in both the
Victoria and Yamagata lineages but were not found to be significantly different after applying a Bonferroni correction to adjust for multiple comparisons. Thus, the larger amount
of non-synonymous mutations seen for high coverage states provides only weak evidence of
vaccination influencing viral evolution.
Natural selection for high and low vaccination coverage populations as measured by
dN/dS ratios showed to be, in all instances, purifying. All except one measure deviated
significantly from neutrality (dN/dS = 1), with the single non-significant result occurring
in the 2017-2018 season for the Victoria lineage, where no non-synonymous mutations were
identified. Altogether, these results do not support a conclusion of vaccine-induced selective
pressure and are in line with what has been observed in other studies. Both Debbink et
al. (2017) and Dinis et al. (2016) found antigenic diversity of influenza A strains to be
similar between vaccinated and naive individuals and concluded that seasonal vaccination
had limited impact on diversity.
The results for the Victoria lineage from the 2017-2018 influenza season appear to stand
in contrast to the previously stated findings. During this season, the HA segments from
California, the low coverage population, achieved perfect separation in the phylogenetic tree
from the samples belonging to Delaware. Moreover, mean dS estimates were found to be
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significantly different between the two states. Although a visual inspection of the phylogenetic tree suggests that vaccination may be associated with the diverging evolutionary paths,
further analysis of the mutations present in both populations refutes this conclusion. Both
mean dS and dN estimates were smaller for Delaware, the high coverage state, indicating
less diversity overall. These findings do not align with the expectation that a selective pressure will produce more mutational variants. Furthermore, there were no non-synonymous
mutations found in the samples belonging to Delaware indicating that the changes that led
to branching events in the phylogenetic tree were likely driven by synonymous mutations.
Synonymous mutations generally do not result in immune escape. Lastly, the dN/dS ratio
does not deviate significantly from neutrality and as such does not support a finding of
positive selection.
Despite findings being mostly consistent with what has been observed in other studies for
influenza A, these results cannot be considered thoroughly conclusive, and the limitations of
the study should be noted. The ecological study design has a well-known disadvantage that
impedes projecting inferences made from a group onto individuals. Samples were collected
based on the statewide vaccination coverage percentages the CDC reported; however, the
actual vaccination status for the hosts of the viral samples is unknown. As such, it is
plausible that the results observed in this study are due to sampling. Further exacerbating
this possibility is a small sample size. The median number of samples available for high and
low coverage populations infected with the Victoria and Yamagata lineages was 18.5 and 17,
respectively. With so few data points, the likelihood of the samples correctly representing
the reported coverages is greatly diminished. It should be noted that under an ecological
study design, the objective is not to accurately represent the distribution of the variable
measured in aggregate, but rather to maximize the probability that the sample holds the
actual exposure or outcome of interest. In this thesis, vaccination status is measured in
aggregate as a coverage percentage where, ideally, samples from low coverage populations
will belong to unvaccinated hosts and vice versa. As is usually the case, larger sample sizes
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would benefit the analyses by increasing the likelihood of correctly obtaining the desired
exposure. Statistical testing would also be improved as a post hoc analysis revealed the
power for the tests shown in tables 4.3 and 4.4 to be consistently under 5%.
Differences in host immunological characteristics may also be confounding analyses and
results. As suggested by Dinis et al. (2016)., when possible, analyses should adjust for
differences between hosts by grouping participant data by their biological characteristics and
analyzing each stratum separately. Such in-depth information about host genetics is rarely
if ever collected outside of a specialized study. Instead, variables that code for external traits
that may be associated with differences in host genetics are used. The age of the host was
used as a proxy to adjust for prior immune experience to influenza B by restricting samples
to belong to hosts between 18 and 64 years. Although the age distributions for hosts were
not significantly different between low and high coverage populations (tables 4.1 and 4.2),
controlling for age may not be sufficient as exposure histories can vary given other factors like
socioeconomic status, type of employment, etc. Unlike with age, it was not possible to control
for the different racial and ethnic makeup of the states used for the study. Due to disparities
in health coverage, vaccine uptake will likely vary among races, and, depending on their
ethnic background, hosts may present different biological and immunological characteristics
making this a potential source for residual confounding.
This study uses viral samples taken from hosts at a single point in time. As such, it is
only a snapshot of the viral evolution taking place during infection. Because no follow-up
data were available for analyses, it is uncertain if samples taken at a separate point in time
would have produced different results. Although the findings of this study concur with what
has been observed for the H3N2 and pandemic H1N1 strains of influenza A virus (Debbink
et al., 2017; Dinis et al., 2016), influenza B has been shown to undergo a slower evolution
(Berton et al., 1984; Yamashita et al., 1988; Webster & Berton, 1981), and it is possible that
any selective pressure produced by vaccination will not be observable within a single season.
Human challenge studies, where volunteers are intentionally infected with a virus to fur30

ther research could answer some of the limitations of this thesis provided they are conducted
under ethical guidelines. In the past, challenge trials have been used to evaluate vaccine efficacy for influenza (Balasingam & Wilder-Smith, 2016) as well as for studying the disease’s
natural history (Carrat et al., 2008). Under a controlled experiment, questions regarding
confounding and study power would be more easily addressed. There is also the potential to
follow individuals for more than a single influenza season, thus allowing to asses the impact
vaccination has over an extended period of time.
Although not thoroughly conclusive, the results obtained in this thesis suggest that vaccination does not significantly impact the evolution of either lineage of influenza B. The higher
frequencies of non-synonymous substitutions found for higher coverage populations were the
only evidence for differing evolution, and more research is needed to evaluate if the trend
consistently persists under study designs that produce stronger evidence. Further analysis
comparing the divergence between high and low coverage populations to the vaccine strain
should also be undertaken. Using the yearly vaccine strain as a reference, Chong and Ikematsu (2017) identified a significantly greater rate of amino acid differences at epitope sites
in vaccinated individuals. For this thesis, dN and dS values were calculated using pairwise
comparisons between populations and did not show any significant differences. However,
whether either population evolves away from the vaccine strain at a different rate is not
answered with this analysis.
The purpose of this thesis was to analyze the evolutionary patterns of influenza B in the
presence of vaccine-induced selective pressure. The results of this study should not serve
as definitive answers, but rather as a basis for further research into viral evolution. This
study adds to the body of information available for influenza B virus in humans. Under the
persisting threat of another pandemic, research has mostly focused on influenza A subtypes,
and influenza B lineages have gone understudied. The main contribution of this work is to
increase knowledge about the effects of vaccination in the viral evolution of influenza B.
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Appendix A: Submitting Laboratories

Table A-1: Authors, originating and submitting laboratories of the sequences.
Segment ID
EPI816151

Collection date
05/03/16

Isolate name
B/Florida/58/2016

EPI745091

02/29/16

B/Florida/30/2016

EPI738441

01/19/16

B/Florida/10/2016

EPI721278

01/14/16

B/Florida/04/2016

EPI694914

12/06/15

B/Florida/83/2015

EPI806671

12/01/15

B/Connecticut/61/2015

EPI777524

04/08/16

B/Connecticut/24/2016

EPI777508

04/19/16

B/Connecticut/28/2016

EPI777484

04/21/16

B/Connecticut/30/2016

EPI777468

03/18/16

B/Connecticut/16/2016

EPI777460

03/24/16

B/Connecticut/19/2016

EPI777453

03/24/16

B/Connecticut/18/2016

EPI777446

03/29/16

B/Connecticut/20/2016
40

Originating Lab
Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health

Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI773016

Collection date
02/29/16

Isolate name
B/Connecticut/07/2016

EPI765301

12/01/15

B/Connecticut/61/2015

EPI754469

02/09/16

B/Connecticut/10/2016

EPI754465

02/09/16

B/Connecticut/10/2016

EPI754457

02/08/16

B/Connecticut/09/2016

EPI754450

02/08/16

B/Connecticut/09/2016

EPI754442

02/18/16

B/Connecticut/04/2016

EPI754434

02/18/16

B/Connecticut/04/2016

EPI745059

03/02/16

B/Connecticut/11/2016

EPI686370

12/01/15

B/Connecticut/61/2015

EPI755090

03/09/16

B/Florida/42/2016

EPI739358

02/17/16

B/Florida/28/2016

EPI739350

02/17/16

B/Florida/26/2016

EPI738770

02/06/16

B/Florida/21/2016
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Originating Lab
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Florida Department of
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
Health-Jacksonville

Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI695253

Collection date
12/11/15

Isolate name
B/Florida/82/2015

EPI695245

12/07/15

B/Florida/81/2015

EPI917763

01/10/16

B/Florida/05/2016

EPI776977

04/25/16

B/Florida/57/2016

EPI763438

03/04/16

B/Florida/36/2016

EPI721270

12/21/15

B/Florida/85/2015

EPI714717

01/17/16

B/Florida/03/2016

EPI714701

01/10/16

B/Florida/05/2016

EPI710601

12/21/15

B/Florida/85/2015

EPI700918

01/02/16

B/Florida/01/2016

EPI674905

10/21/15

B/Florida/75/2015

EPI674889

10/14/15

B/Florida/77/2015

EPI765772

02/20/16

B/Florida/34/2016

EPI674897

10/14/15

B/Florida/76/2015
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Originating Lab
Florida Department
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Tampa
Florida Department
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department
Health-Jacksonville

of

Submitting Lab
CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI808062

Collection date
04/18/16

Isolate name
B/Virginia/41/2016

EPI807941

04/02/16

B/Virginia/35/2016

EPI807598

02/15/16

B/Virginia/10/2016

EPI777572

04/26/16

B/Virginia/44/2016

EPI777020

03/16/16

B/Virginia/34/2016

EPI755098

03/13/16

B/Virginia/26/2016

EPI739957

02/23/16

B/Virginia/13/2016

EPI830996

04/21/16

B/Virginia/23/2016

EPI825619

04/21/16

B/Virginia/23/2016

EPI806775

04/21/16

B/Virginia/25/2016

EPI806768

04/21/16

B/Virginia/24/2016

EPI763264

04/06/16

B/Virginia/20/2016

EPI763208

03/10/16

B/Virginia/09/2016

EPI753996

03/26/16

B/Virginia/15/2016
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Originating Lab
Submitting Lab
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
Virginia Division of ConsolCDC
idated Laboratories
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI737780

Collection date
02/25/16

Isolate name
B/Virginia/03/2016

EPI737772

02/27/16

B/Virginia/02/2016

EPI977594

03/15/17

B/Texas/40/2017

EPI969665

03/06/17

B/Texas/33/2017

EPI971059

03/20/17

B/Texas/38/2017

EPI943818

02/15/17

B/Texas/22/2017

EPI943780

01/26/17

B/Texas/16/2017

EPI941873

02/09/17

B/Washington/10/2017

EPI941865

02/07/17

B/Washington/09/2017

EPI908918

01/04/17

B/Washington/02/2017

EPI1089749

02/10/17

B/Washington/37/2017

EPI1020592

04/26/17

B/Washington/31/2017

EPI1011767

04/09/17

B/Washington/25/2017
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Originating Lab
Submitting Lab
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
University of Virginia,
CDC
Medical Labs/Microbiology
Texas Department of State
CDC
Health Services-Laboratory
Services
Texas Department of State
CDC
Health Services-Laboratory
Services
San Antonio Metropolitan
CDC
Health
San Antonio Metropolitan
CDC
Health
San Antonio Metropolitan
CDC
Health
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1009757
EPI977663
EPI969729
EPI941857
EPI918011
EPI978520
EPI978512
EPI960416
EPI943802
EPI943795
EPI1008824
EPI1008800
EPI1008792
EPI1008784

Collection date
Isolate name
Originating Lab
Submitting Lab
04/09/17
B/Washington/25/2017 Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
03/19/17
B/Washington/21/2017 Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
03/04/17
B/Washington/17/2017 Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
01/29/17
B/Washington/08/2017 Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
01/15/17
B/Washington/05/2017 Washington State Public
CDC
Health Laboratory
03/20/17
B/Texas/41/2017
Houston Department of
CDC
Health and Human Services
03/21/17
B/Texas/42/2017
Houston Department of
CDC
Health and Human Services
01/28/17
B/Texas/07/2017
Houston Department of
CDC
Health and Human Services
02/13/17
B/Texas/19/2017
Houston Department of
CDC
Health and Human Services
02/13/17
B/Texas/18/2017
Houston Department of
CDC
Health and Human Services
03/27/17
B/Texas/56/2017
Baylor Scott and White
CDC
Health
03/18/17
B/Texas/53/2017
Baylor Scott and White
CDC
Health
03/13/17
B/Texas/51/2017
Baylor Scott and White
CDC
Health
03/03/17
B/Texas/50/2017
Baylor Scott and White
CDC
Health
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Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1039897

Collection date
Isolate name
04/19/17
B/Connecticut/51/2017

EPI1026043

04/19/17

B/Connecticut/50/2017

EPI1026027

04/10/17

B/Connecticut/47/2017

EPI1026019

04/09/17

B/Connecticut/46/2017

EPI1025987

03/26/17

B/Connecticut/42/2017

EPI1025971

03/16/17

B/Connecticut/40/2017

EPI1025963

03/14/17

B/Connecticut/39/2017

EPI1025955

03/13/17

B/Connecticut/38/2017

EPI1025947

03/13/17

B/Connecticut/37/2017

EPI1025931

03/10/17

B/Connecticut/35/2017

EPI1025923

03/07/17

B/Connecticut/34/2017

EPI1025915

03/03/17

B/Connecticut/33/2017

EPI1025931

03/10/17

B/Connecticut/35/2017

EPI1025923

03/07/17

B/Connecticut/34/2017
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Originating Lab
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health

Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1025931

Collection date
Isolate name
03/10/17
B/Connecticut/35/2017

EPI1025923

03/07/17

B/Connecticut/34/2017

EPI1025915

03/03/17

B/Connecticut/33/2017

EPI1007822

04/28/17

B/Connecticut/31/2017

EPI1001974

04/20/17

B/Connecticut/29/2017

EPI1001966

04/18/17

B/Connecticut/28/2017

EPI995079

03/22/17

B/Connecticut/22/2017

EPI995063

03/18/17

B/Connecticut/20/2017

EPI978401

03/03/17

B/Connecticut/18/2017

EPI969420

01/26/17

B/Connecticut/12/2017

EPI969404

01/24/17

B/Connecticut/10/2017

EPI963635

01/24/17

B/Connecticut/10/2017

EPI963627

01/26/17

B/Connecticut/12/2017

EPI924150

01/16/17

B/Connecticut/07/2017
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Originating Lab
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health
Connecticut Department.
of Public Health

Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI909320

Collection date
01/09/17

EPI909030

12/28/16

EPI1051533

04/11/17

EPI1051525

04/04/17

EPI1051520

04/03/17

EPI1051512

04/03/17

EPI1051504

04/03/17

EPI1026272

03/28/17

EPI1026264

03/27/17

EPI1026248

03/21/17

EPI1026240

03/14/17

EPI1026232

03/13/17

EPI1026208

03/06/17

EPI1020474

03/06/17

Isolate name
B/Connecticut/04/2017

Originating Lab
Submitting Lab
Connecticut Department.
CDC
of Public Health
B/Connecticut/34/2016 Connecticut Department.
CDC
of Public Health
B/Louisiana/36/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/35/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/34/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/32/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/31/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/30/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/29/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/26/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/25/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/24/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/21/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
B/Louisiana/10/2017
Louisiana Department of
CDC
Health and Hospitals
48

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1007945

Collection date
04/19/17

Isolate name
B/Louisiana/18/2017

EPI1007937

04/18/17

B/Louisiana/17/2017

EPI984850

03/27/17

B/Louisiana/16/2017

EPI984842

03/27/17

B/Louisiana/15/2017

EPI971002

03/07/17

B/Louisiana/12/2017

EPI970988

03/06/17

B/Louisiana/10/2017

EPI964011

02/22/17

B/Louisiana/07/2017

EPI1228854

03/01/18

B/California/29/2018

EPI1196436

01/30/18

B/California/10/2018

EPI1165288

10/27/17

B/California/52/2017

EPI1165280

11/24/17

B/California/59/2017

EPI1165224

10/22/17

B/California/66/2017

EPI1162634

12/28/17

B/California/90/2017

EPI1147819

11/25/17

B/California/61/2017

49

Originating Lab
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
Louisiana Department
Health and Hospitals
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services

Submitting Lab
of
CDC
of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1165288

Collection date
Isolate name
10/27/17
B/California/52/2017

EPI1165280

11/24/17

B/California/59/2017

EPI1165224

10/22/17

B/California/66/2017

EPI1162634

12/28/17

B/California/90/2017

EPI1147819

11/25/17

B/California/61/2017

EPI1141681

12/24/17

B/California/88/2017

EPI1141673

12/22/17

B/California/87/2017

EPI1141578

12/12/17

B/California/84/2017

EPI1141562

12/12/17

B/California/82/2017

EPI1141554

12/12/17

B/California/81/2017

EPI1141546

12/11/17

B/California/80/2017

EPI1141538

12/11/17

B/California/79/2017

EPI1137617

12/22/17

B/California/76/2017

EPI1130539

10/22/17

B/California/66/2017
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Originating Lab
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services
California Department
Health Services

of

Submitting Lab
CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

of

CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1124626

Collection date
Isolate name
11/24/17
B/California/59/2017

EPI1137617

12/22/17

B/California/76/2017

EPI1130539

10/22/17

B/California/66/2017

EPI1124626

11/24/17

B/California/59/2017

EPI1124578

11/25/17

B/California/61/2017

EPI1117868

10/27/17

B/California/52/2017

EPI1273402

05/07/18

B/Delaware/29/2018

EPI1253844

05/07/18

B/Delaware/29/2018

EPI1246626

04/17/18

B/Delaware/26/2018

EPI1228743

02/08/18

B/Delaware/22/2018

EPI1228727

02/07/18

B/Delaware/20/2018

EPI1228719

02/07/18

B/Delaware/19/2018

EPI1228695

02/06/18

B/Delaware/16/2018

EPI1228664

02/04/18

B/Delaware/15/2018
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Originating Lab
California Department of
Health Services
California Department of
Health Services
California Department of
Health Services
California Department of
Health Services
California Department of
Health Services
California Department of
Health Services
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab
Delaware Public Health
Lab

Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1228656
EPI1225766
EPI1220788
EPI1206765
EPI1196880
EPI1182443
EPI1273639
EPI1257422
EPI1257306
EPI1247801
EPI1247460
EPI1229301
EPI1212154
EPI1206820

Collection date
Isolate name
Originating Lab
02/01/18
B/Delaware/14/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
03/09/18
B/Delaware/11/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
03/20/18
B/Delaware/12/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
02/26/18
B/Delaware/09/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
01/27/18
B/Delaware/05/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
01/19/18
B/Delaware/02/2018 Delaware Public Health
Lab
05/07/18
B/Florida/31/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
05/26/18
B/Florida/36/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
05/09/18
B/Florida/32/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
04/19/18
B/Florida/28/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
04/24/18
B/Florida/29/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
04/07/18
B/Florida/26/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
03/12/18
B/Florida/19/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
02/26/18
B/Florida/15/2018 Florida Department of
Health-Tampa
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Submitting Lab
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC
CDC

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1196896

Collection date
01/24/18

Isolate name
B/Florida/06/2018

EPI1196736

02/06/18

B/Florida/11/2018

EPI1167320

01/02/18

B/Florida/01/2018

EPI1162714

01/08/18

B/Florida/02/2018

EPI1229285

04/07/18

B/Florida/27/2018

EPI1210465

03/05/18

B/Florida/16/2018

EPI1202639

02/20/18

B/Florida/13/2018

EPI1196929

01/28/18

B/Florida/08/2018

EPI1164971

12/05/17

B/Florida/108/2017

EPI1137799

12/05/17

B/Florida/108/2017

EPI1206749

03/02/18

B/Washington/19/2018

EPI1206741

03/02/18

B/Washington/18/2018

EPI1196872

02/02/18

B/Washington/13/2018

EPI1175148

01/12/18

B/Washington/05/2018
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Originating Lab
Submitting Lab
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Tampa
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Florida Department of
CDC
Health-Jacksonville
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab
Seattle and King County
CDC
Public Health Lab

Table A-1 (Continued)
Segment ID
EPI1175140
EPI1257502
EPI1246875
EPI1226102
EPI1214776
EPI1206757
EPI1175164
EPI1137585
EPI1130965
EPI1130957
EPI1117914
EPI1117906
EPI1117898
EPI1094295

Collection date
Isolate name
Originating Lab
01/08/18
B/Washington/04/2018 Seattle and King
Public Health Lab
04/10/18
B/Washington/37/2018 Washington State
Health Laboratory
04/05/18
B/Washington/31/2018 Washington State
Health Laboratory
03/28/18
B/Washington/29/2018 Washington State
Health Laboratory
03/18/18
B/Washington/24/2018 Washington State
Health Laboratory
02/13/18
B/Washington/16/2018 Washington State
Health Laboratory
12/15/17
B/Washington/49/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
11/30/17
B/Washington/45/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/25/17
B/Washington/41/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/12/17
B/Washington/40/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/15/17
B/Washington/39/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/25/17
B/Washington/41/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/12/17
B/Washington/40/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
10/15/17
B/Washington/39/2017 Washington State
Health Laboratory
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County

Submitting Lab
CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Public

CDC

Appendix B: IRB Study Approval

4/4/2019
Lindsey Fiedler
College of Public Health
Tampa, FL 33612
RE: Expedited Approval for Initial Review
IRB#: Pro00040038
Title: Evolutionary Dynamics of Influenza Type B in the Presence of Vaccination: An
Ecological Study
Study Approval Period: 4/4/2019
Dear Dr. Fiedler:
On 4/4/2019, the Institutional Review Board (IRB) reviewed and APPROVED the above
application and all documents contained within, including those outlined below. Please note this
study is approved under the 2018 version of 45 CFR 46 and you will be asked to confirm
ongoing research annually in place of a full Continuing Review. Amendments and
Reportable Events must still be submitted per USF HRPP policy.
Approved Item(s):
Protocol Document(s):
Proposal
It was the determination of the IRB that your study qualified for expedited review which
includes activities that: (1) present no more than minimal risk to human subjects, and (2) involve
only procedures listed in one or more of the categories outlined below. The IRB may review
research through the expedited review procedure authorized by 45 CFR 46.110 and 21 CFR
56.110. The research proposed in this study is categorized under the following expedited review
category:
(5) Research involving materials (data, documents, records, or specimens) that have been
collected, or will be collected solely for nonresearch purposes (such as medical treatment or
diagnosis).

Your study qualifies for a waiver of the requirements for the informed consent process for this
retrospective chart review as outlined in the federal regulations at 45 CFR 46.116 (f), which
states that an IRB may approve a consent procedure which does not include, or which alters,
some or all of the elements of informed consent, or waive the requirements to obtain informed
consent provided the IRB finds and documents that: (1) the research involves no more than
minimal risk to the subjects; (2) the research could not practicably be carried out without the
requested waiver or alteration; (3) if the research involves using identifiable private information
or identifiable biospecimens, the research could not practicably be carried out without using such
information or biospecimens in an identifiable format; (4) the waiver or alteration will not
adversely affect the rights and welfare of the subjects; and (5) whenever appropriate, the subjects
or legally authorized representatives will be provided with additional pertinent information after
participation.
As a reminder, please contact USF IT at help@usf.edu to set up your Box.com study folder
before storing data on the cloud. You will need to include the name of the Principal Investigator
(folder owner), study title, data to be stored, and a list of IRB-approved study team members in
your email to USF IT. For additional information, please see section 12.2 of USF HRPP Policy.
As the principal investigator of this study, it is your responsibility to conduct this study in
accordance with IRB policies and procedures and as approved by the IRB. Any changes to the
approved research must be submitted to the IRB via an Amendment for review and approval.
Additionally, all unanticipated problems must be reported to the USF IRB within five (5)
business days.
We appreciate your dedication to the ethical conduct of human subjects research at the
University of South Florida and your continued commitment to human research protections. If
you have any questions regarding this matter, please call 813-974-5638.
Sincerely,

E. Verena Jorgensen, M.D., Chairperson
USF Institutional Review Board

